In recent decades, full-scale wars and cold wars were often regarded as remnants of history, valuable primarily as lessons on the dangers of unchecked rivalry and ideological confrontation. Many believed that the modern world, shaped by institutions and economic interdependence, had moved beyond such conflicts. Yet, these assumptions now appear increasingly tenuous. Today, the dynamics of great-power competition and regional instability suggest that the world has not left these patterns behind but is instead witnessing their resurgence in new forms. The growing rivalry between the United States and China has been described as a ‘Cold War II’, evoking comparisons to the ideological and strategic tensions of the mid-20th century. At the same time, discussions of a potential ‘World War III’, once confined to speculative fiction, have entered the realm of serious analysis among policymakers and academics. These concerns are not abstract.
The ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating violence in the Middle East highlight the volatility of the current international system, while rising tensions in Asia, particularly around Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea, suggest that great-power competition is far from dormant. Meanwhile, internal conflicts such as the civil war in Sudan, highlight the enduring capacity of localised crises to generate widespread instability. Taken together, these developments point to an unsettling conclusion: the world appears to be moving away from an era of relative stability toward one characterised by rising conflict and strategic uncertainty. Rather than being confined to the history books, the forces that shaped the conflicts of the 20th century are once again shaping the global order.
History Repeats Itself
The current period bears closer resemblance to the pre-WW I and pre-WW II eras than is often acknowledged. While it is true that today’s world order is more institutionalised and countries are more economically interconnected, a ‘zero-sum’ perspective is increasingly shaping international relations.
The most notable parallel lies in the multipolar distribution of global power, a structure historically regarded as the most unstable. In a multipolar system, multiple great powers possess significant capabilities and divergent interests, increasing the likelihood of miscalculations and unintended conflict. Additionally, the absence of clear power blocs fosters fluid and short-term alliances, complicating the management of alliance systems. Finally, smaller states in a multipolar order often exploit their position to engage with multiple powers selectively, asserting greater independence and contributing to an atmosphere of unpredictability. This closely mirrors the dynamics of the pre-WW I era, when power in Europe was divided among a few major states, including Germany, Russia and Great Britain.
The alliance structures of that time, shaped by both natural power balances and Bismarck’s diplomacy, created a precarious environment where a localised incident could quickly escalate into a continental war. In such systems, alliances often operate under the dual risks of ‘chain-ganging’, where states are drawn into conflict due to alliance commitments, and ‘buck-passing’, where states defer responsibility for action in hopes that others will take the lead. Today, the rise of China and emerging middle powers, the proliferation of formal and informal alliances, and growing tendencies toward expansionism collectively evoke parallels with the pre-war era.
Today, much like in the period preceding WW I, offensive strategies are gaining prominence in military thinking. The belief that offensive operations can be executed more effectively, rapidly, and advantageously than defensive measures reflects a shift in the strategic calculus of many states. In the years leading up to WW I, the ‘cult of the offensive’ dominated policymaking circles, fostering the notion that proactive aggression was the best means of ensuring security.
This mindset is widely regarded as a contributing factor to the reckless escalations that ultimately triggered the conflict. Similarly, contemporary geopolitics has elevated the prioritisation of military capabilities within many governments. Global military spending has reached a historic high of $2,440 billion this year, reflecting a renewed focus on warfare as a critical component of statecraft. Advances in technology further reinforce this trend. Innovations such as drones and satellite networks have significantly reduced the costs and logistical challenges of offensive operations, making them more accessible and appealing.
Moreover, the nature of warfare itself has evolved. Limited wars, once a more common occurrence, are increasingly giving way to conflicts that resemble total wars, characterised by their societal, economic and multidimensional scope. Modern wars now engage not only military forces but also societal resources, economic restructuring and operations across multiple domains, including land, sea and air. In addition, the ongoing war in Gaza illustrates the increasingly blurred lines between state warfare, insurgencies, and the actions of non-state actors.
The pandemic, coupled with rising migration driven by conflicts and economic hardship, have amplified populist and nationalist sentiments in many regions.
At the societal level, the parallels are no less notable. While the decisions to go to war ultimately rest with leaders and policymakers, the readiness of societies to mobilise is a decisive factor. In the years leading up to WW II, the economic dislocation caused by the Great Depression placed societies under severe strain, leading to protectionist measures that curtailed international trade and fostered economic nationalism. Currency devaluations exacerbated these tendencies, while the broader economic instability discredited democratic institutions, creating fertile ground for the rise of populist leaders who promised order and stability. War also became a means to redirect public discontent in economic turmoil.
The economic hardships of the era also intensified competition over resources, weakening prospects for international cooperation and further deepening divisions. Simultaneously, a combination of economic and internal political pressures fuelled the spread of radical nationalism across Europe. Today, while the global economy is much more robust, significant stresses persist. The disruptions caused by the pandemic and the rise of restrictive trade practices have led to renewed economic challenges. Trade wars between the United States and China, efforts by BRICS nations to establish an alternative currency, and a broader skepticism toward globalisation indicate a gradual erosion of the economic consensus that has underpinned international stability in recent decades.
Moreover, the pandemic, coupled with rising migration driven by conflicts and economic hardship, have amplified populist and nationalist sentiments in many regions. In the West, growing divisions between native populations and migrant communities have contributed to the increased appeal of populist leaders, reflecting a societal polarisation that, while not identical, bears structural similarities to the pre-war period.
Beyond economic interdependence and international norms, the most significant deterrent to major wars has been the existence of nuclear weapons. The understanding of the mutually catastrophic consequences of nuclear exchanges has, for decades, compelled great powers to avoid breaching the so-called ‘nuclear taboo’. However, this restraint appears to be weakening, with nuclear weapons increasingly entering public and strategic discourse in ways that suggest a lowering of the threshold for their potential use.
Direct discussions of using nuclear weapons were rare a decade ago, while such discussions have become more frequent, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. This shift carries two significant risks. First, the normalisation of nuclear brinkmanship may heighten the likelihood of miscalculation, potentially drawing multiple states into a catastrophic conflict. Second, the erosion of the nuclear taboo could undermine the perceived gravity of nuclear weapons, reducing their deterrent value over time and leading to a more unstable global security environment.
Order and Disorder
Historically, following major wars, states have often sought to establish a new order to stabilise the international system. This order might take the form of comprehensive institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or the League of Nations, or simpler agreements designed to maintain a balance of power. However, over time, these systems are subject to natural decay. While such decay is not totally inevitable, it becomes increasingly likely if proactive measures to sustain the order are not taken. Several factors contribute to this decline. First, the balance of power is inherently dynamic and shifts over time as states rise and fall in relative strength. Second, the norms and principles underpinning the order gradually lose their influence as their legitimacy is tested by evolving circumstances and unforeseen events.
Third, human nature itself plays a role; there is a recurring tendency to challenge established systems and seek alternatives. At the societal level, for instance, traditional values and norms are often re-examined over time, with questions arising about their continued relevance. Similarly, in the international arena, prolonged adherence to an order leads to skepticism, particularly when the benefits of maintaining it are no longer evident or compelling.
While it would be premature to assert that the post-WW II order has been entirely overturned, it is clear that this order is increasingly being challenged and questioned. One indication of this is the persistent criticism of the UN, which many argue has become ineffective and in need of substantial reform.
The US remains committed to maintaining the current liberal order, but revisionist powers such as China and Russia advocate for an alternative system not grounded in liberal values or US leadership. These efforts have gained significant support from emerging middle powers, many of which feel marginalised and underrepresented within the existing framework. The European Union occupies a somewhat unique position in this landscape. While it supports a liberal world order, its intrinsic commitment to multilateralism leads it to favour a more inclusive system—one that is less dependent on any single superpower.
These divergent perspectives on how the world should be governed highlight the growing complexity of global politics. As different actors advance competing visions of order, future conflicts are likely to be shaped by deeper and more multifaceted disagreements over fundamental principles of governance and power distribution.
(Views expressed are personal)
Ali Mammadov is a PhD researcher at George Mason University, Schar School of Policy and Government
(This appeared in the print as in our time)
